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THE THEODORE I. KOSKOFF LECTURE SERIES:
SOCIAL NORMS AND BIG GOVERNMENT
By Cass R. Sunstein"
I have some stories for you to begin. I spend summers on the east
end of Long Island (near the recent fire) because my in-laws are there.
There are many interesting things that one could notice in the
Hamptons. One thing that is noticeable in the last few years is the
change from the East Hampton dump to the East Hampton Recycling
Center. When in late August I went there to throw out and separate my
garbage, what I saw was extremely fancy cars-BMW's and Mercedes;
there was one Rolls Royce-people with informal but extremely ex-
pensive clothes patiently separating their garbage, making sure the
green glass was different from the white glass and that the newspapers
were all sorted, spending a lot of time at the East Hampton Recycling
Center. And they looked happy.
The second story comes from my old boss, Thurgood Marshall,
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Depart-
ment of Political Science, University of Chicago. This is a lightly edited version of a lecture
delivered at Quinnipiac College School of Law in October 1995. Some of the issues are discussed
in more detail in Social Norms and Social Rules, COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996, May).
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who is famous for arguing the Miranda case and for being a staunch
defender of the outcome in Miranda. Once he thought Miranda was
maybe going to be overruled by the Burger Court, he came to us and
said, "You know, it would be bad, but Miranda isn't a big deal." He
said, "If the police are going to beat people up they are going to beat
people up. Miranda isn't crucial. I'll tell you how that stops." And he
told a story about a chief of police getting together twenty-five of his
officers and saying, "If anyone here beats anybody up, they're fired."
Then he said with a big guffaw, "That's how you stop police miscon-
duct."
The third story has to do with teenage smoking, something which
the President is very interested in reducing. The newspapers have sug-
gested that there has been a large increase in teenage smoking, which
isn't quite true. Among whites, teenage smoking now is about the same
as it has been for the past fifteen years. Think of what might have hap-
pened, what would you expect would have happened in this period
among African American teenagers? Well, here is the appropriate data.
In 1965, thirty percent of African American teenagers smoked appro-
priate cigarettes. In 1987, the number had dropped to twenty percent.
In 1993, the number was four point four percent. This is recognized by
the Center for Disease Control as a terrific public health success story
for which the Center of Disease Control has no explanation. I have a
hunch about what explains it. And it's connected with a poster that
appeared adjacent to a highway-in a billboard in Harlem, New York,
a poster that was part of a private educational campaign by the African
American community designed to reduce teenage smoking. The poster
has a picture of the Marlboro man looking like a skeleton offering a
cigarette to an African American child and saying, "First they had us
pick it; now they want us to smoke it." Something very important has
happened in that community with respect to teenage smoking.
Only one more story, this has to do with economists. Economists
are interested in figuring out how much environmental amenities are
worth. One way they try to figure that out is they ask people how
much they are willing to pay for environmental amenities. You might
be asked how much you would be willing to pay to save a pond. Or
how much would you be willing to pay to save the spotted owl, or how
much would you be willing to pay to reduce a risk from .005% of you
getting cancer to .0005% of getting cancer. Economists believe that if
you ask someone how much would you be willing to spend for goods
you should give the same amount as if you're asked how much would
you have to be paid to have a reduction in the equivalent thing. There
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is an intuition that these numbers should be the same. It turns out that
the economists have this equivalence as an axiom. But the equivalence
doesn't hold. When people are asked how much would they be willing
to pay to allow the extinction of a spotted owl, they will give a num-
ber. They're asked how much would they have to be paid, they give a
higher number. In fact, much of the time they give an answer like, "I
don't answer questions like that," or, "There is no number high
enough," or, "What sort of a person do you think I am?" This is an
anomaly. It's causing some havoc in the economics community.
There's a unifying theme in the stories I've told, and that has to
do with the pervasive effect of social norms on behavior. And I'm
going to be discussing the relationship between social norms and law in
the effort to make a partial defense of my not-currently-trendy thesis,
that is a defense of big government.
A defense of big government would have to have a lot of compo-
nents. And I'm going to trace right now, very quickly, three of the
components that I'm not going to spend much time on. One component
in the defense of big government would start by reading the Contract
of America and noting that sharp distinctions are drawn between mar-
kets on the one hand and government on the other. My suggestion
would be there is no distinction between markets and government.
Markets depend for their existence on government. We cannot have
markets without government. In fact, we cannot have markets without
taxing and spending. Markets depend for their existence on police,
property law, contract law, tort law-an extensive state apparatus that
can't get in motion without some taxing and some spending. The dis-
tinction-which is so dominant in popular debate right now-between
markets and government is built on a conceptual error, that is the prop-
osition that we could have markets without government.
That's not a criticism of markets. It's an observation that markets
depend on something like or close to big government.
A full defense of big government would add to this point a list of
the terrific success stories that we've had as a result of government
regulation in the last thirty years. In the environmental area, air is
much cleaner than it was twenty-five years ago, where in Chicago you
couldn't open the windows without getting noticeable pollution in your
face. It used to be the case that a hundred fifty million Americans lived
in areas that didn't meet federal air quality standards. Now only fifty
million Americans don't live in places that don't meet federal air quali-
ty standards. That's not great, but it's a wonderful improvement. The
air is much cleaner than it would otherwise have been, and people are
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living longer and better as a result. So too, the water is much cleaner.
In many ways America is the envy of the industrialized world because
it has clean water compared to what it would have had without our
regulatory efforts. In the area of voting rights and discrimination too,
things are a lot better than they were as a result of governmental initia-
tive.
Thus the picture of massive government failure is way off the
mark. There are many failures, but the overall picture is complex, not
simple.
The full case for big government would depend as well on the old
ideal of equality of opportunity. My suggestion would be that equality
of opportunity is not at odds with liberty; it is part and parcel of it.
And equality of opportunity cannot exist without a large government
trying to provide decent life prospects to people who now do not have
decent life prospects. And the Contract of America is missing that
extremely old American ideal. It used to be that equality of result was
opposed to equality of opportunity; but equality of opportunity was in
the 1970s an important conservative theme which justified governmen-
tal initiatives. It seems to have dropped out.
What I'm going to emphasize, as I've said, is social norms-in
particular, the possibly harmful effects of social norms on human liber-
ty and well-being. My suggestion is that governmental action designed
to make for good social norms is an important and underexplored ave-
nue for law. This is a realm in which a lot of good things can be done;
but it's something on which lawyers and politicians have spent far too
little of their time. Four hundred thousand people die each year as a
result of smoking; three hundred thousand people die as a result of diet
and failure to exercise; a hundred thousand people die from cars and
guns; and in all of these cases social norms are an important contribu-
tor to the problem. If we could do something about the norms, we
could do something enormously important. This issue has gotten a lot
of attention in the area of teenage pregnancy, and here a culprit is so-
cial norms that it would be very good to change. Think now about the
sharply diminishing rate of smoking among young African Americans
and think of how that might be a model for strategies that would
lengthen and improve lives.
I'm just going to tell you now the claims I'm going to make and
then spend the rest of the talk trying to elaborate on them a bit. First:
A lot of anomalies in individual behavior-such as the difference be-
tween how much people would be willing to pay to preserve a species
and how much people would have to be paid to allow a species to go
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extinct-are just a product of social norms that affect us every day and
make us do things that are surprising or might be surprising. Many
puzzles in behavior are less puzzling if we attend to the pervasive role
of social norms. Second: Often people live with norms that they simul-
taneously don't like but can't change on their own. To change a norm
with respect to, for example, what a teacher ought to wear to class or
to give a lecture is something an individual can't do anything about.
My proposition is there are social norms all over the place that we live
with, are governed by, but of which we don't approve if we reflect.
Collective action is necessary to do something about them.
Third: I suggest that social states are often far more fragile than
they seem, and, in fact, change is far more likely than it seems, partly
because what people want, and by people I mean to include all of us, is
a function of what other people want and of what we perceive other
people to want. When we start to perceive other people's perceptions
as different from what we thought, things can change very fast. Some-
thing like this has happened, I believe, in the United States with respect
to affirmative action. Whatever we think of the merits of the attack on
affirmative action, there has been real fragility in the proaffirmative
action policy. One of the reasons is, there was widespread social dis-
content about affirmative action that wasn't expressed because people
perceived it as illegitimate to criticize affirmative action. Once the
criticism started being expressed and legitimated, people's perceptions
of what other people thought shifted very fast and there was a social
movement.
How was communism maintained for so long? How did it fall so
fast and so safely in most Eastern European countries? One of the
reasons is that there were social norms in place under communism that
suggested we all had to join the Party and celebrate it, even though
hardly anyone celebrated it. Once the social norms with respect to ap-
proval of communism started to shift there was a bandwagon effect or
a cascade, and things changed really rapidly. The same thing happened
in South Africa with respect to apartheid.
Fourth: I'm going to suggest that sometimes social norms are an
obstacle to human liberty or autonomy and sometimes social norms
help maintain something like a caste system on the basis of race and
sex. We don't have in the United States a true caste system, but our
system has features of racial and gender caste in the sense that there
are signals given by one's skin color or one's gender that one can't do
much about and that is associated in many places with certain pre-
scribed social roles. To work against them it would be good to do
1995]
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something about prevailing norms, and to do that it would be good to
use law.
Now let me offer three concepts: Social norms, social roles, and
social meanings. First, what I've referred to, is social norms. By this I
mean to refer to social attitudes of disapproval and approval, embodied
in the notion that "it isn't done." With respect to lots of behavior there
is a reaction, "it isn't done." Even though it sometimes is done, the
term "it isn't done" is a reflection of evaluation and disapproval. Now
norms cover a very wide range-what sorts of words one uses, what
counts as good manners, how one deals with one's elders or people
who are younger, and so forth. Norms are pervasive and invisible only
because they're so deeply internalized that they don't come out to the
surface much. There are social norms with respect to such things as
smoking, discriminating, using condoms, buckling seat belts and recy-
cling. These norms are often fragile. One's choices about what to do,
whether to smoke, whether to discriminate, whether to buckle a seat
belt, whether to be courteous-these things are a function, for each
individual, not just of the value of the relevant thing but also of the
reputational value of doing or having that thing, that is, smoking, hav-
ing a Hispanic in one's restaurant or buckling one's belt. It's also a
function of one's self-conception if one does these sorts of things.
There are many people, I assert, who don't buckle their seat belt and
who do smoke as a result of social norms and the opposite too. Often
one will or will not buckle because of the group of people with whom
one finds oneself. One will or will not smoke for just that reason; the
reputational effect plays a very large role in individual choices.
It's also the case that one's self-conception plays a large role.
There is a mystery in the fact that Stephen Hawking's book, "A Brief
Moment in Time," was a best seller. This was a book that was bought
by people of whom it is said hardly any read the book. Why did people
buy it? My speculation is that some of the purchases had to do with the
reputational value of having the book and with one's feeling about
one's self-conception from owning the book.
Choices are pervasively a product not just of the intrinsic value of
the underlying thing but also of reputational effects and effects on
one's self-conception. The reputational effects and the effects on one's
self-conception are partly a function of social norms. Prevailing norms
will have a lot to do with reputation and probably a good deal with
self-conception. This is why I think the people recycling in East
Hampton were so happy. It's not as if there was intrinsic joy in sepa-
rating the various things; but they felt good about themselves, they felt
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good about being seen doing this sort of thing; and therefore they
undertook a choice that would have been completely astonishing ten
years before.
I have an economist colleague who has a dog and in Chicago
there is a norm, there's a law too, that you clean up after your dog.
And he said, "You know, at night I walk my dog, and when he does
what he does I clean up even if it's dark." He said, "I don't know why
I do that. I hate the act, it subjects me to a certain amount of danger,
and yet I do it." He said, "I would have thought it would have been
about reputation, but it's dark, no one can see me." I think the reason
he does it is that he's internalized the norm so he thinks it's a wrong
thing to do to leave that material there for the next morning. And that's
why in many areas of the country something is true now that would
also have been astonishing years ago, that is, no dog poop on the side-
walks.
That's the first concept, the idea of social norms. The second
concept involves the notion of social roles-something that also has a
great deal to do with law but hasn't been explored much by people
thinking about law. Each of us occupies an astonishingly wide range of
social roles: child, parent, sibling, student, teacher, voter, consumer,
eater in a restaurant. Each of those roles is surrounded by a complex
network of social norms, so much so that if one acted in one role the
way one acts without thinking in another role it would seem very bi-
zarre. If one treated, for example, one's employer the way one treats a
friend, in most American work places that would be perceived as quite
strange. If a teacher treated a student the way a teacher treats a doctor,
wouldn't you think that teacher is very confused? Or if you treated
your lawyer in the same way you treat your waiter, your lawyer would
think this is odd. Or if your waiter treated you the way your friends
treat you; that would be very unusual, except in California, I guess. In
any case, each social role is pervaded by social norms that people
know about, adhere to, rarely step out of, even though some of us
some of the time wish our social roles were a bit different. And here
too changes in social roles are just about impossible at the individual
level.
The feminist movement has everything to do with the effort to
change social norms associated with the social role of being a woman.
When homosexuals "flaunt it," there might be a self-conscious effort to
change the social role of being a homosexual, that is to be closeted.
The point here is that social roles are pervasive and also we are, with
respect to them, acted on as much as we are acting. If we're going to
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change them we need some help. We can't do it on our own.
The third and last concept let's call social meaning. And here I'm
drawing on some work by anthropologists and also some recent work
in law on exactly this idea. By social meaning I mean the attitudes and
commitments that are communicated by words or actions. Words or
actions communicate something independent of the words that are
actually being used. For example, the use of the term "Miss" or "Mrs."
now means something very different from what it meant forty years
ago. There is something very specific signaled if one of your instruc-
tors calls women students Miss or Mrs. The social meaning being
communicated might well be independent of the intentions of the
speaker. With respect to a wide range of terms, social meanings attach
over which the speaker has no control. If a teacher calls a student by a
first name or if a student calls a teacher by a first name, something is
being signaled that the individual agent doesn't have much control
over. If a teacher wears blue jeans to class at many law schools, some-
thing very particular is connoted. If someone buckles a seat belt in
some parts of the world, or if a woman refuses to cook dinner in many
parts of the world, or if a man or woman insists on the use of a con-
dom in many places, there is a particular social meaning to the act
which agents don't have control over and might be unfortunate. There
was an article in the New York Times a few weeks ago in which some
young men were saying they don't use condoms with their girlfriends
because their girlfriends would take that as a confession that they're
promiscuous. Now that's a problem. They may not need to be blamed
for it. But it's true the social meaning of condom use is a confession
or, in some circles, an accusation. Social norms, social meanings, and
social roles matter. If people see one another cooperating by giving
time or money, working pro bono, donating to charity, writing tenure
letters, then they tend to cooperate, too. But if they don't see one an-
other cooperating, rates of noncooperation skyrocket. This is true in
both experimental and real world settings. Whether people cooperate to
solve a shared problem is a function of the perceived behavior of other
people. This may not seem a puzzle; but for certain theories of rational
behavior it is indeed a puzzle. Cooperation is closely enmeshed with
social norms.
Economists have invented a game. It's called the Ultimatum
Game. This is a game in which two people are given a bunch of mon-
ey to play a game. The game has one act in it, that is one person of the
two says to the other person, "I will give you X amount of this pot." If
the second person says, "I accept," they both get to keep the relevant
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amounts. If the other person says, "I don't accept," neither gets to keep
a penny. In experimental settings what would you expect would hap-
pen? How much would the first person propose and what would the
second person accept? The economists predicted the following: The
first person acting in a self-interested way will say, "I'll offer you a
penny." And the second person will say, "Great." The first person acts
in the self-interested way; the second person acts in a self-interested
way; both people are better off. But this is not what happens. People
almost never offer a penny, and when they do it's not accepted.
There's a very high percentage of fifty/fifty, sixty/forty, seventy/thirty
splits. This is because there is a powerful social norm saying that if
you accept a penny you're showing your willingness to be subjected to
contempt or dishonor. And if you offer that little, then you're showing
a willingness to treat someone else in a contemptuous way. And there
are extremely powerful social norms against that. People feel ashamed
in both contexts.
This example aligns my argument with some of the arguments in
modem politics about deploying shame as a policy instrument. Shame
is certainly not an intrinsic good, but shame is important and reduces
conduct that inflicts harm on other people. This little story tends to
show that what seems like anomalies often are a function of deeply
internalized social norms, which when they disappear, make people's
lives go much less well.
I am also concerned about the use of words like "choices" or
"preferences" to foreclose discussion of what government ought to be
doing. Often it is said that people choose some acts, and it is asked,
what business is it of Big Brother to alter the choice? At least as a
general rule, what business is it of government to interfere with their
preferences? And in very tempting arguments, the words "their choic-
es" or "their preferences" opt as conversation stoppers. I hope what
I've said already suggests that this argument goes by much too fast, if
our preferences and choices are artifacts of norms and roles and mean-
ings that we haven't voluntarily assumed and that we may not like but
we can't change on our own. If the meaning of our choice not to go in
a car which we know is going to go extremely fast is cowardice, then
we might go in that car or even drive in that way. That's enmeshed
with social norms over which people have very little control. And to
attribute that to them--to say that that's their choice or their prefer-
ence-is too quick. In the New York Times article I mentioned about
condom use, young men were saying they didn't use condoms because
they did not want their girlfriends to think they were sleeping around.
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They weren't happy with that situation. They weren't sleeping around.
They wanted the social meaning of condom use to be different from
what it was. To say we should respect their choice would be a much
too simple answer.
Incidentally, I'm told by my sister-in-law who works on AIDS
education in Bali, that there's been a remarkable change in Bali in the
last seven years, so that young Balinese men consider their condom use
a very macho thing. Now, she's not sure how this social norm has
gotten in place, but she says it's wonderful. If in Bali there is going to
be some protection, so to speak, against what's happened in many
countries like Bali, this is a way.
Now let's turn to government. How might government do some-
thing about problematic norms or meanings and roles? Let's have an
ascending order of intrusiveness. The most lenient thing government
can do is just provide information. Changing social norms with respect
to smoking has a great deal to do with additional information. When
we undertake behavior that is dangerous and perceived as such, there
are often strong social norms against it. It's very interesting to see in
religious communities the extent to which there are norms about diet
and behavior that are permeated with beliefs about safety; but the mor-
al issues associated with the diet have outrun the safety belief so that
it's believed it is morally wrong to perform some acts. The moral judg-
ment has become more deeply ingrained than the health judgment. In
any case, with respect to a great number of things, simple provision of
information does the trick.
Government might try to go beyond information and try to per-
suade. This is what's happened in the area of smoking and drug use
and safe sex. The efforts of persuasion may be futile, but it's a possible
approach.
There might also be an effort to change social norms with a tax.
Consider a tax on cigarettes or alcohol or other dangerous behavior.
And that might change the relevant norm.
Or the government might try, most simply, coercion by banning
conduct.
Now what I'm going to do is to go through several categories of
cases in which governmental action designed to change norms and
roles and meanings might well be justified. To make the justification
full in any individual case, one would have to say more than I'm going
to say. I'm just going to go through a set of cases.
The simplest is the set of cases I have described. That is, cases
involving norms that people want to change but can't change on their
QLR
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own. They require governmental or collective help of some kind. Now,
there is a very intriguing class of laws which exist which are almost
never enforced, but which accomplish an enormous amount of
good-that have a kind of symbolic function just by virtue of the fact
that they are there. These include laws forbidding littering, laws requir-
ing seat belts to be buckled, laws encouraging or requiring recycling,
and laws requiring people to clean up after their pets. These are laws
that have contributed an enormous amount to environmental improve-
ment. And the way they do that is signaling something that has a pow-
erful effect on people's norms. And in these cases government can
relatively cheaply use the law to attempt what the majority wants, that
is norm change.
The second kind of case has to do with the difference between the
social role of consumer and the social role of citizen. Both of us occu-
py these two roles. We buy things and watch things and we vote and
we make public policy recommendations. Here is the key proposition.
In our capacity as consumers we may live within norms which we
simultaneously, in our capacity as citizens, deplore. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is under some attack now in some prominent circles. An
interesting fact is that that act was supported by restaurants that were
discriminators. Restaurants that acknowledged their own discriminatory
behavior favored the law. How could that be? What they said was, "If
we open our doors to African Americans, what will happen is that
we'll be in social trouble because the norm is we're not supposed to do
that. But we just want to make profits. If you give us this law, we can
make more profits and we won't confront the old norm." These are
cases in which people, in their capacity as citizens, urge results that
differ from their own private consumption behavior. Many Americans
favor more educational programming for children on television, or
more public affairs programming on television for themselves. Would
they watch it? Would they ask their children to watch it? Maybe not.
Is it illegitimate for people in their capacity as citizens to urge and get
results that diverge from what happens from consumption choices? I
don't think so. And words like "choices" tend to cloud the issue.
In many parts of the world, and in some parts of America, to be
well educated is inconsistent with social norms. Probably most of the
people in this room have encountered some places where if you say
you're in law school, people don't say, "Great." They might say a wide
range of things. But one thing some people might say is, "Who do you
think you are," something like that. Now, there are many places in the
world and some places in America where norms in a relevant commu-
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nity operate powerfully against people's efforts to educate or better
themselves by going to school or taking school seriously. Many of the
hardest problems that people face is running up against social norms
that make their efforts to better themselves by their own lights seem a
source of shame. It's parallel to the condom story and the seat belt
story; but maybe more poignant because it involves people's basic life
prospects. There are things that government can do and that can be
done collectively to make it so that education isn't stigmatizing but the
opposite. There are places in the world where women who try to be-
come literate are ostracized. And by acting on social norms the law
might well be able to do something about it.
I have referred to the issue of caste. And by the issue of caste I
mean just the fact that even in a free society like ours there are statuses
that people have. For example, the experiences of African Americans
vis-a-vis the police are systematically different from the experiences of
white people vis-a-vis the police. That's one sense in which we have
something like a caste system in the United States. There are similar
things with respect to sex roles where there are many places where if a
woman says, "I'm not making dinner tonight. I'm going out to a meet-
ing," the signal that's given is fundamentally different from the similar
signal for a man.
Now, the antidiscrimination laws are, in some circles, under attack
as liberty denying. But we might think that the liberty issue is much
more complicated than that, in the face of social norms that are con-
nected with caste-like features of existing social practices. And if what
the law can do is alter the norm, liberty might be promoted rather than
undermined. There are many norms that undermine human well-being;
for example, norms that make it seem very good for a teenage boy to
have gotten a woman pregnant; norms that make it seem very good for
a teenage girl to have a child, notwithstanding her inability to take care
of it; norms that make being on welfare seem highly desirable and
being in work at a low-paying job seem a social stigma. There are
norms that encourage hazardous behavior that is undermining of human
well-being. There are things that law might be able to do about this. It
might be counterproductive; it might be futile; but this is an unexplored
area where law could do a lot of good.
My last point has to do with what we might call the expressive
function of law. With respect to our own behavior, often what we do is
connected with the message the action expresses as much as with the
consequences. There are famous philosophical puzzles about whether
you would shoot an innocent person when a terrorist threatens other-
[Vol. 15:147158
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wise to shoot a hundred people. Would you shoot the terrorist? Would
you shoot the person the terrorist tells you to shoot if the terrorist
would otherwise shoot a hundred people? Most react to that by saying,
"I don't know. I don't know if I could. I don't know if I would." Most
people hesitate. It's partly because of the expressive function of action
and what one is expressing about oneself by shooting an innocent
person. Law too often has an expressive function in the sense that it
signals national or social commitments, partly in order to make for
change with respect to (say) endangered species, recycling, smoking,
sex equality. The expressive function of law doesn't have directly to do
with consequences but instead with the norms that are being signalled
and promoted.
At this stage it's probably worth mentioning that the term "politi-
cal correctness" is very interesting along this dimension because the
term "political correctness," as it's deployed, operates to make people
seem pitiful and weak if they believe, for example, that sexual harass-
ment is a bad thing. And it's a brilliant term because of its shifting
effect on social norms. It makes it so that what was otherwise forward-
looking and bold seems shameful and stepping with the crowd.
It is time to conclude. It is often said that the government should
respect people's preferences and choices. I've suggested that that's too
simple, because preferences and choices are often an artifact of roles,
norms and meanings. All of these things, that is, roles, norms and
meanings, can be obstacles to human liberty or autonomy or well-be-
ing. Of course governmental efforts to change them might be futile or
it might be counterproductive. But, it might not. It would be a shame if
the antigovernment rhetoric of the last decade foreclosed efforts to seek
change by repeating a mantra about the need to respect choice.
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